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We  discuss  the  literatures  on  behavioral  economics,  bounded 
rationality and experimental economics as they apply to firm behavior 
in  markets.  Topics  discussed  include  the  impact  of  imitative  and 
satisficing behavior by firms, outcomes when managers care about 
their position relative to peers, the benefits of employing managers 
whose  objective  diverges  from  profit-maximization  (including 
managers who are overconfident or base pricing decisions on sunk 
costs), the impact of social preferences on the ability to collude, and 
the  incentive  for  profit-maximizing  firms  to  mimic  irrational 
behavior. 
1.  Introduction 
In recent years there has been a good deal of research investigating how poor or non-standard 
decision making by  consumers might affect market outcomes.  In much of this work, the 
assumption is that firms are fully rational and aim to maximize their profits (and sometimes 
they do this by exploiting the behavioral biases of consumers). Some of this work points to 
situations where there is a role for policy which protects consumers from their own failings 
and from exploitative firms.
2  
 
In this article we focus instead on non-standard approaches to firm behavior. Consumers are 
kept in the background, and are present merely to generate in some fashion a demand curve 
for the firms' products. We present evidence - both real world and experimental - that firms 
(or  experimental  subjects  playing  the  role  of  firms)  sometimes  depart  from  the  profit-
maximizing paradigm. For instance, firms may be content to achieve "satisfactory" rather 
than  optimal  profits,  firms  might  rely  on  simple  rules  of  thumb  -  such  as  imitating  the 
                                                           
1 We are grateful to Matthew Bennett, David Evans, Emanuele Giovannetti, Joe Harrington, David Ruck, David 
Sappington, John Vickers, Eric Van den Steen, Mark Williams, and to the Office of  Fair Trading and the 
Economic and Social Research Council (UK) for funding assistance. 
2 See Armstrong (2008) for a review of some of this literature and its implications for consumer protection 
policy. As observed by Ellison (2006, page 145), fifty years ago the focus was instead very much on non-
optimizing behavior by firms rather than consumers. 2 
 
strategies  of  well-performing  rivals,  or  continuing  with  strategies  which  have  performed 
reasonably well in the past - rather than on explicit calculation of complex optimal strategies, 
firms may base pricing decisions on sunk costs as well as avoidable costs, CEOs may be 
overly optimistic about the profitability of mergers or other actions they undertake, managers 
might face incentives which induce them to care about relative rather than absolute profits, 
firms might punish rivals who behave "unfairly" towards them, and so on. We believe that 
many mainstream industrial economists and policy-makers are not  yet fully  aware of the 
substantial  literature  on  these  topics,  and  our  aim  in  this  survey  is  to  bring  some  of  the 
insights of behavioral economics as applied to firm behavior to wider attention.
3  
 
There are, of course, a number of reasons why one might expect firms to be better decision 
makers than consumers, and this helps to explain the recent focus on consumer failings. First, 
there are economies of scale in making good decisions. A consumer may have to decide 
whether to buy a given product just a few times and it may not be worthwhile to invest much 
effort in making the right decision, while a firm selling to millions of customers has more at 
stake in getting it right. Relatedly, since firms often do the same things repeatedly, they may 
quickly learn how to do it right, while a consumer buying a rarely-purchased product may not 
have that opportunity. Second, firms compete with each other while consumers usually do 
not, and firms that are better at optimizing profits may succeed and prosper at the expense of 
firms which make worse decisions.
4 In modern society, consumers rarely "exit" when they 
make poor market decisions. 
 
However, there are also a number of considerations which go the other way:  
 
·  Firms typically operate within a highly complex and uncertain environment, and may 
need to resort to decision-making short-cuts and rules-of-thumb. 
                                                           
3 The recent financial crisis may well have stemmed in part from a variety of behavioral biases of some of the 
banks' executives. For instance, some managers may have been over-optimistic about the risks they were taking 
in their lending strategies, and there may also have been a herd mentality among some managers, who imitated 
apparently successful lending strategies and who may have felt there was "safety in numbers".  
4 Milton Friedman (1953, page 22) is the most famous exponent of this pervasive view: "Let the apparent 
determinant of business behavior be anything at all - habitual reaction, random chance or whatnot. Whenever 
this determinant happens to lead to behavior consistent with rational and informed maximization of returns, the 
business will prosper and acquire resources with which to expand; whenever it does not, the business will tend 
to lose resources and can be kept in existence only by the addition of resources from outside. The process of 
'natural selection' helps to validate the hypothesis [of 'rational and informed maximization of returns'] - or, 
rather, given natural  selection, acceptance of the  hypothesis can be based largely on  the judgement that it 
summarizes appropriately the conditions for survival." Posner (1998, page 1570) makes a similar point: "People 
who cannot calculate probabilities will either avoid gambling, if they know their cognitive weakness, or, if they 
do not, will soon be wiped out and thus be forced to discontinue gambling. People who are unusually 'fair' will 
avoid  (or,  again,  be  forced  out  of)  roughhouse  activities  -  including  highly  competitive  businesses,  trial 
lawyering,  and  the  academic  rate  race.  Hyperbolic  discounters  will  avoid  the  financial-services  industry."  
Nevertheless, at various points in this survey we will see examples of situations where profits are increased 
when the objective of the firm diverges from maximizing profits or when "behavioral" managers are put in 
place. 3 
 
·  Firms  often  face  the  added  complexity  stemming  from  strategic  interaction  with 
rivals, which consumers rarely do when buying products.
5 For instance, in even the 
simplest situations, theories of tacit collusion or reputation-building require firms to 
follow highly intricate strategies. 
·  In practice, under-performing firms may take a long time to exit, and there is often a 
long period of decline before an established firm actually leaves the market. More 
generally, the complexity of the environment may mean that crucial decisions are 
taken with significant delay.
6 
·  Group decision making (as practised more often by firms rather than by consumers) 
could introduce extra biases. For instance, the separation of ownership from control 
could leave managers free to pursue their own objectives different from maximizing 
shareholder value. In fact, this last point can be turned on its head: in imperfectly 
competitive markets, shareholder returns might be enhanced by (deliberately or not) 
having managers whose objectives differ from maximization of profit. That is to say, 
actual  profits  might  be  enhanced  when  the  firm's  objective  departs  from  profit-
maximization.  For  instance,  hiring  an  "aggressive"  or  "over-optimistic"  CEO,  or 
rewarding a CEO based on her performance relative to peers, or employing a CEO 
who bases pricing decisions on sunk costs, might all have strategic benefits. 
·  Relatedly, the people who succeed in the tough career competition to manage firms 
might  have  these  kinds  of  personality  traits  more  frequently  than  the  general 
population.  Sometimes  it  seems  that  managers  are  motivated  in  part  by  personal 
animosity - or respect - towards a rival.  
·  More generally, it seems clear that an individual manager's "style" can be important - 
for  good  or  ill  -  for  a  firm's  performance.
7  A  manager  may  on  occasion  have  a 
personal interest in the firm's product (say, a sports team or newspaper) beyond the 
profit it generates, and this may cause a divergence from profit-maximization.
8 
                                                           
5 Hayek (1945, section VI) argued that a central merit of competitive markets, that is, price-taking behavior by 
consumers and  firms, is that agents'  strategies are then relatively simple. (Agents need to know only  their 
endowments,  preferences  and  the  market  prices  to  optimize.)  Gale  and  Sabourian  (2005)  argue  that  in 
oligopolistic markets, where optimal strategies may in theory be extremely complex, if agents incur "complexity 
costs" when they pursue complex strategies then the outcome might be more competitive than the standard 
theory suggests. 
6 The take-up of technological improvements in agriculture provides useful evidence. Ellison and Fudenberg 
(1993) quote a historian of the English agricultural revolution as writing "land tilled in very ancient ways lay 
next  to  fields  in  which  crop  rotations  were  followed".  Ellison  and  Fudenberg  report  that  the  agricultural 
practices known as the "new husbandry" diffused through England and France at the rate of one mile per year. 
7 See Bertrand and Schoar (2003) for an empirical analysis of the importance of "manager fixed effects". For 
instance,  they  find  that  managers  with  an  MBA  tend  to  follow  more  aggressive  strategies.  They  find  that 
managers differ in their attitude to mergers, dividend policy, and cost-cutting policy.  
8 An interesting example of this was seen in the Genzyme-Novazyme merger-to-monopoly which was approved 
by the FTC in 2004. This was a merger of two firms both engaged in R&D for treating a rare disease, where the 
prime danger from the merger was whether the discovery of a successful treatment would be delayed relative to 
the duopoly outcome. One factor in the decision was that the proposed CEO of the merged entity had two 
children with the disease, who may therefore not have wished to delay discovery. See the statement by the then 
FTC chairman Timothy Muris, available at www.ftc.gov/os/2004/01/murisgenzymestmt.pdf.  4 
 
·  Illegal  cartels  need  to  find  ways  to  resolve  disagreements  about  market  shares, 
whether  cheating  has  occurred,  and  so  on,  without  recourse  to  legally  binding 
agreements. As such, issues to do with building trust and esprit de corps amongst 
conspirators are important. 
·  Finally, the potential presence of a "behavioral" type of firm in a market could induce 
a profit-maximizing firm to mimic irrational behavior. For instance, a firm might wish 
to gain a reputation to fight entry come what may, in order to deter future entry. 
 
In the remainder of this article, we discuss several of these points in greater detail. Section 2 
surveys the experimental evidence on the ability of firms to collude, and how public policy 
could affect this ability. Section 3 discusses the (as we will see) related issues of imitative 
behaviour by firms and concerns for relative (not absolute) profit, both of which often make 
an oligopolistic market more competitive than the orthodox theory suggests. Other forms of 
social preferences - a desire for vengeance if a rival "cheats" on a collusive agreement, say - 
are presented in section 4, which we argue may help sustain collusive agreements. Various 
kinds of satisficing behavior are discussed in section 5, where we show how imperfectly 
optimizing  firms  may  actually  end  up  with  greater  profits  than  their  profit-maximizing 
counterparts. Section 6 collects together thoughts on some additional topics, including the 
impact of overoptimism by entrepreneurs and managers, the imitation of irrational behaviour 
by profit-maximizing firms, and the possible benefits of including fixed costs in a firm's 
pricing decisions. Concluding comments are contained in section 7. 
 
We do not attempt in this article to survey the entire terrain of behavioral economics as 
applied to firms. In particular, our focus is on firms' behavior in markets rather than on the 
internal organization of firms. (There is for instance a vast literature looking at how CEO 
behavior affects firm performance, which we touch on only briefly when we mention the 
possible benefits of overoptimism by managers and other issues connected with non-profit 
aims of managers.) In addition, we do not emphasize the potential policy implications of non-
standard behavior by firms, although a few remarks about this are made throughout the paper. 
 
First, however, it is worthwhile discussing the role of laboratory experiments - which supply 
much  of  the  empirical  evidence  we  present  in  the  following  discussion  -  as  an  aid  to 
understanding firm behavior. Laboratory experiments usually involve students playing the 
role of firms, who make decisions in minutes and for relatively low stakes, whereas real firms 
employ  managers  who  are  highly-remunerated,  experienced  and  carefully  selected.  Why 
should these experiments tells us anything about the performance of actual markets? There 




                                                           
9 See Section III of Holt (1995) for further details. See Hinloopen and Normann (2009) for a collection of papers 
discussing the use of experiments for competition policy. 5 
 
First, experiments have been run with business people as subjects instead of students, and the 
latter  do  not  appear  to  perform  less  (or  more)  rationally  than  the  former.
10  In  addition, 
experimenters are careful to ensure that their subjects have a good deal of experience in 
playing the chosen game before they start putting weight on the data generated. Indeed, it is 
possible  that  subjects  have  more  experience  playing  the  highly  stylized  games  in  the 
laboratory than real managers have in their own naturally occurring markets. Second, Plott 
(1989, page 1165) writes: "The relevance of experimental methods rests on the proposition 
that laboratory markets are 'real' markets in the sense that principles of economics apply there 
as well as elsewhere. Real people pursue real profits within the context of real rules. The 
simplicity of laboratory markets in comparison with naturally occurring markets must not be 
confused with questions about their reality as markets." Thus, theories and models that work 
generally should also work in the particular cases of laboratory markets.  
 
Third,  many  theories  in  industrial  organization  are  very  subtle,  and  depend  on  detailed 
assumptions about what firms observe about their rivals, and what firms can say to their 
rivals. Information flows can be carefully controlled in the laboratory, while the environment 
of  naturally  occurring  markets  is  harder  to  pin  down,  and  it  is  often  impractical  to  test 
complex  theories  about  oligopoly  behavior  using  non-experimental  data.  For  instance, 
experiments  are  able  to  examine  tacit  collusion,  in  which  no  communication  is  possible 
between firms, while it is hard to be sure there is no communication going on in a real 
market. It is also extremely hard to measure such important parameters as marginal costs in 
natural markets, while these can be accurately generated in the laboratory.
11 Nevertheless, 
worries about the relevance of laboratory experiments should not be dismissed too casually: 
the worry that student behavior does not always closely match CEO behavior is probably 
more serious for oligopoly experiments than for other experiments (such as those concerning 
shopping or bargaining), and it is hard convincingly to replicate the detailed institutional 
structure of firms - such as hierarchies and group dynamics - in the laboratory.  
 
2.  Ability to Sustain Collusion 
Collusion  between  oligopolists  occurs  when  firms  can  sustain  relatively  high  prices  by 
credibly threatening a price war should a firm undercut the prevailing price (or boost its 
output). Firms need to interact repeatedly for high prices to be sustained, since a firm must 
trade off high profits now (if it deviates and undercuts its rivals) with low profits in the future 
(after a price war is triggered). A typical "trigger" strategy to sustain high prices takes the 
                                                           
10 For instance, see DeJong et al. (1988). 
11 In much empirical work on naturally occurring markets, marginal costs are inferred from observed data such 
as prices by assuming firms maximize their profit. We discuss the dangers of this method when firms might 
potentially not be optimizers at the end of this paper. The fact that marginal costs are rarely directly observable 
makes it hard to perform tests of the profit-maximization hypothesis. Levitt (2008) is a rare example of such a 
test. He obtained data from a relatively "simple" firm which supplies bagels and donuts to businesses, and where 
marginal costs are known. He finds that the firm is extremely good at predicting demand for given prices, but 
apparently prices too low given the estimated demand elasticity. (Interestingly, the decision-maker for this firm 
is a well-trained economist, who has even published in the Journal of Political Economy.) 6 
 
form: each firm sets the collusive price so long as all firms did this in the past, but if one or 
more firms sets a price below the collusive price, all firms subsequently set prices according 
to the one-shot equilibrium strategy (e.g., set price equal to marginal cost if firms supply 
homogenous  products).  Although  even  this  simplest  setting  involves  complex  strategies, 
including the need somehow to coordinate on the particular collusive price, matters become 
vastly more complex if firms are asymmetric, if demand varies over time, if firms cannot 
observe each others' price (and so cannot tell if low demand now is due to an adverse demand 
shock or due to one firm offering a low price), and so on.
12  
 
Fully rational firms (who are sure that their rivals are also rational) cannot sustain collusion if 
there is a known end-point to their interaction, no matter how far this is in the future. (If the 
market ends after 100 periods, in the 100
th period firms know there is no future to punish 
them, and so let low prices to undercut its rivals, and the one-shot equilibrium is played. In 
the 99
th period, firms know what will happen next period, so again have no incentive to 
cooperate then. And the whole repeated interaction unravels, with the result that no collusion 
is ever sustained.) Collusion is relatively harder to sustain when there are more firms in the 
market. With many firms in the market, the short-run benefits of a price cut are relatively 
large compared to getting a small share of the on-going collusive profits. This means that 
collusion between many firms requires a higher discount factor (i.e., more weight placed on 
future collusive profits) than does collusion between few firms. Nevertheless, theory suggests 




Collusion is also likely to be harder to sustain if firms cannot observe each others' actions 
(see Stigler, 1964). For instance, if a firm cannot tell if its low demand is due to an adverse 
market shock or due to an undercutting rival, then it may be reluctant to punish the rival 
harshly (since punishment hurts itself as well), and this could make collusion hard to achieve. 
But if a firm can observe a rival's actual price, it can punish harshly when that price is low, 
and so make collusion more effective. For this reason, frequent information exchange is a 
vital part of many cartels.
14  
 
Collusive  behavior  in  the  laboratory:  How  do  firms  behave  in  repeated  interactions  in 
experiments? A typical experiment to analyze this question is conducted as follows: 
 
·  The same group of subjects play a stylized oligopoly game (say, Cournot quantity 
competition or Bertrand price competition) repeatedly for a number of periods. The 
number of periods is either fixed (and announced in advance) or random (with, say, a 
                                                           
12 See Ivaldi et al. (2003) for an account of the theory of collusion,  assuming rational firms. 
13 For instance, in the case of Bertrand price competition and homogenous products, the fully collusive outcome 
can be sustained in an infinitely repeated interaction with n symmetric suppliers if the discount factor δ satisfies 
δ > 1 - 1/n. With reasonable choices for the discount factor and say, monthly price adjustment, collusion should 
be possible in oligopolies consisting of a hundred firms.  
14 For instance, see Levenstein and Suslow (2006). 7 
 
90% chance of another interaction after each period's play). In the latter case, the 
likelihood  of  having  another  interaction  plays  the  role  of  the  discount  factor, 
representing how important the future is. 
·  In each period, the actions available to each firm might be very restricted (e.g., with 
just two possibilities: "cooperate" or "compete" as in the Prisoner's Dilemma) or more 
numerous (e.g., choosing any integer output from 0 to 100). 
·  The payoff structure of each period's game might be described in full to each player if 
the actions are not too numerous (e.g., if playing a Cournot game a payoff table shows 
how a player's profit depends on her own chosen output and the aggregate output of 
the rivals.) If actions are numerous, then subjects may be given a "profit calculator" 
which gives the subject's profit as a function of some specified values for her own 
action  and  those  of  her  rivals.  Alternatively,  the  payoff  structure  might  not  be 
revealed at all, and after each period's play a subject sees her own realized profit, as 
well as (possibly) the actions and realized profits of her rivals. 
·  Particular  market  features  could  be  introduced.  For  instance,  players  could  be 
permitted to make (non-binding) announcements in advance about what actions they 
will follow, or players could decide whether to form a cartel.
15 
 
A focus of the literature has been to observe the extent of collusion in the laboratory market 
(say, measured  as the  ratio of actual profits to the theoretical one-shot Nash  equilibrium 
profits), and how this depends on the discount factor (or number of periods in the fixed-
period case), the number of oligopolists, the kind of information revealed to participants, or 
whether they can make pre-play announcements about their actions. Note that it is only in a 
sterile  laboratory  setting  that  one  could  investigate  some  of  these  questions,  where  the 
information and communication flows can be precisely controlled.  
 
This is not the place for a detailed summary of the large literature on experimental repeated 
oligopoly. But some highlights include the following observations.
16 First, the importance of 
the future does affect the extent of collusion. Feinberg and Husted (1993) performed Cournot 
experiments  with  two  different  probabilities  of  continuing  interaction,  and  observed  that 
collusion was more prevalent with the higher probability. This is qualitatively in line with 
predictions of the behavior of fully rational firms.
17 However, many experiments find that 
collusion can still be observed even when there is a fixed number of periods, against the 
                                                           
15 Some experiments randomly match subjects in each period, so that firms play against different rivals in each 
period. In addition, some experiments force subjects to make decisions under strict time pressure, to try to 
simulate the real-world complexity of decision making. However, real markets do not frequently operate with 
these features, and so we do not discuss such experiments in detail. 
16 See sections 2 and 3 of Huck, Normann and Oechssler (2004a) for a brief survey. 
17 Feinberg (1995) argues that social welfare may sometimes be higher when firms' managers are relatively 
"myopic" or short-termist, perhaps because of high managerial turnover or the kinds of incentive schemes they 
are offered, since collusion thereby becomes harder to sustain. For the same reason, it seems plausible that 
shareholders who wish to achieve collusion would not wish to put in place a manager who was myopic or had 
hyperbolic time preferences. 8 
 
prediction of rational play.
18 Of course, even with a finite horizon it is perfectly rational to 
cooperate for a time if one thinks that there is a chance one may be playing against a naïve 
opponent who is playing something like a trigger strategy (see section 6 below for further 
discussion). But it is common to observe that collusion breaks down as the known endpoint 
nears.   
 
In experimental markets, it appears that the number of oligopolists is crucial in terms of the 
ability  to  collude  tacitly,  i.e.,  where  firms  cannot  communicate  directly  with  each  other. 
Huck,  Normann,  and  Oechssler  (2004a)  document  (and  cite  previous  studies  observing 
similar results) how there is very little tacit collusion in Cournot markets with three or more 
firms, which conflicts with the theoretical predictions discussed earlier. Indeed, if anything, it 
is more common to observe that markets with more than two firms are more competitive than 
the static Nash prediction. On the other hand, there is a considerable amount of collusion in 
duopolies.
19 One obvious difference between duopolies and oligopolies with more firms is 
that when there is a deviation from the collusive strategy, it is obvious to the two suppliers 
which of them deviated, presuming a deviation is known to have occurred. Moreover, it is 
possible  to  inflict  punishment  on  that  firm  without  hurting  innocent  rivals  who  were 
colluding according to plan. It is possible that notions of "fairness" make it psychologically 
hard for a firm to punish innocent rivals alongside the cheat, which makes collusion difficult 
to sustain with more than two firms.
20 
  
In  Bertrand  markets  with  homogeneous  products,  prices  above  competitive  levels  are 
routinely observed in experiments, even with more than two firms or with a one-shot market 
interaction.
21  However,  these  markets  are  very  special,  in  that  in  one-shot  Bertrand 
equilibrium firms make zero profits, and so the only chance firms have to make positive 
profits is to price above cost (and they have little to lose if they fail to offer the lowest price). 
These markets are discussed further in section 5, where we argue that satisficing behaviour 
by firms is a plausible explanation for observed prices. 
 
                                                           
18 It might seem that this apparent falsification of rational play is not necessarily important in practice, as most 
real  markets  do  not  have  a  known  "endpoint".  Nevertheless,  the  unravelling  argument  applies  even  if  the 
endpoint is uncertain, but it is known for sure that the interaction will have ceased by some date (e.g., if subjects 
in the laboratory do not believe that the experiment could possibly go on for more than a day, or if it is common 
knowledge that the world will have ended in 10 billion years).  
19 As an aside, it is interesting in this regard to recall Bork's (1978, pages 221-2) assertion that any merger which 
left at least three rivals should be presumptively lawful. However, tacit collusion is not the only problem for 
concentrated markets; even the one-shot interaction could be insufficiently competitive when there are few 
firms. 
20 It is, of course, possible that in real markets firms do not suffer significant disutility from harming innocent 
rivals, and so the apparent difficulty of achieving tacit collusion with more than two firms may to some extent 
be an artifact of the laboratory setting. 
21 For instance, see Dufwenberg and Gneezy (2000), Baye and Morgan (2004) and Hinloopen and Soetevent 
(2008). 9 
 
Huck, Normann and Oechssler (1999, 2000) and Offerman, Potters and Sonnemans (2002) 
examine the impact of the experimenter revealing information about each rival's actions and 
payoffs to firms. (Huck et al. investigate four-firm Cournot markets, while Offerman et al. 
look at three-firm Cournot markets.) In some models of tacit collusion (though not the ones 
studied in these laboratory experiments), when firms can directly observe each other's past 
actions,  this  enables  deviations  to  the  collusive  agreement  to  be  detected,  and  so  helps 
collusion be achieved.
22 However, all three studies find that revealing information about rival 
outputs and profits actually renders markets more competitive.
23 Compared to the setting in 
which no firm-specific information is revealed,  they find significantly lower prices when 
firms can observe each other’s actions and profits.
24 While standard economic theory cannot 
easily explain this empirical finding – that competition in the presence of information about 
others is often tougher than in the static Nash equilibrium, sometimes approaching the fully 
competitive outcome where price equals marginal cost – as discussed in section 3 there is a 
class of models in the evolutionary and learning literature that does predict such patterns.  
 
A related issue concerns the impact of communication between firms, and whether the ability 
to engage in some form of communication before market interaction aids collusion in the 
laboratory. (Of course, any agreements made in the communication stage are non-binding and 
purely "cheap talk".) This literature is surveyed in Potters (2009, section 2), who concludes 
that given the opportunity, firms do use the opportunity to conspire to fix prices, and this 
ability often has the effect of raising prices in the market (even with more than two firms). It 
appears  that  face-to-face  talk  has  more  of  a  collusive  impact  than  computer-mediated 
communication, somewhat consistent with the esprit de corps among conspirators we discuss 
later in section 4. Andersson and Wengstrom (2007) report results from an experiment in 
which it is costly to send a message from one firm to another. Intriguingly, they find that as 
the  cost  of  communication  rises  (which  could  be  interpreted  as  the  outcome  of  a  more 
vigilant antitrust policy) fewer messages are sent, as is intuitive, but when messages are sent 
collusion  is  more  effective.  One  interpretation  is  that  firms  feel  more  committed  to  a 
collusive agreement if costs are needed to reach that agreement. The net impact making it 
                                                           
22  An  interesting  real-world  experiment  is  reported  in  Albaek  et  al.  (1997). The  Danish  antitrust  authority 
changed policy so that transactions prices in the concrete market were published, and subsequently the average 
prices rose significantly. The authors argue that the most plausible reason is that this enabled the firms to 
coordinate their prices at a high level.  
23 Offerman et al. also investigated the case where rival outputs but not rival profits was reported, and found that 
the  market  was  then  less  competitive  than  when  no  firm-specific  information  was  reported.  It  would  be 
interesting in future work to see what happens when rival firms' profits (or even just the average profits achieved 
by firms) but not their actions were revealed. It is possible that firms with higher profits than average might 
keep their strategy unchanged, but firms who do poorly revise their strategies, in accordance with a model of 
satisficing behavior discussed below in section 5. In an interesting experiment, Bigoni (2008) allows firms to 
choose the kinds of information they see (e.g., aggregate output of rivals, individual rival outputs, individual 
rival profits) when operating under a time constraint.  
24 Huck et al. (2000) find that when firms set prices rather than quantities, the publication of firm-specific data 
reduces prices only slightly. 10 
 
hard to communicate is that collusion is substantially more prevalent, so that certain forms of 
competition policy might turn out to aid cartel formation and stability.
25  
 
Leniency Policies: Here we continue the discussion of cartel formation in the presence of a 
competition authority, but in the context of leniency policies. Both US and European antitrust 
authorities currently make use of leniency policies for whistle blowers, and in recent years 
the number of cartels detected has increased considerably. The basic idea is that providing an 
incentive to whistle blowers should render cartels less stable, as well as providing antitrust 
authorities with evidence which  would otherwise be hard to obtain. While these benefits 
appear intuitive, theoretical work by Spagnolo (2000) and Motta and Polo (2003) has cast 
doubt on this intuition. The logic of their argument is that firms can use whistle blowing as a 
way to punish those members of a cartel which undercut agreed prices. Ironically, the ability 
to blow the whistle may then help to sustain collusion.  
 
Antitrust authorities have a number of possible policies to fight cartels, including (i) fining 
the participants when misconduct is proved, (ii) granting leniency to cartel members who 
bring evidence of the cartel to the authority, or (iii) rewarding a cartel member if it brings 
forward evidence of the cartel. Apesteguia, Dufwenberg, and Selten (2007) study the impact 
of various leniency policies in an experiment. They study three-firm Bertrand markets under 
four treatments: Standard,  Leniency, Bonus  and  Ideal.  In Standard,  Leniency and  Bonus, 
firms have the opportunity to form a cartel before they interact in the market. (A cartel is 
formed only if all three firms agree to this, and firms interact just once in the market to avoid 
issues  of  tacit  collusion.)  If  a  cartel  is  formed,  the  three  firms  can  communicate  in  an 
unstructured  way  for  10  minutes,  presumably  to  discuss  their  collusive  strategy.  (For 
instance, one possible strategy is to agree a collusive price and to suggest that if one firm 
undercuts the price its rivals report the cartel.) In Standard there is no leniency clause and 
every firm (including the firm that blows the whistle) is fined a fraction of their turnover if a 
cartel has been formed and reported to the authorities. In Leniency the whistle blower gets a 
discount on the fine. (The discount is 100% if there is only one whistle blower, 50% if there 
are two simultaneous whistle blowers, and 33.3% if all three do so.) In Bonus the whistle 
blowers share the fines paid by the cartel members who kept quiet. In the fourth treatment, 
Ideal, the design is such that firms simply do not have the opportunity to form a cartel. 
 
The parameters chosen in the experiments imply that with rational players the Standard and 
Leniency treatments can sustain collusion while Bonus and Ideal cannot. However, the data 
draw a different picture.  In fact, the most effective treatment is not Bonus but  Leniency 
despite  its  potential  theoretical  weaknesses.  In  fact,  Leniency  generates  prices  that  are 
statistically indistinguishable from prices in Ideal where cartel formation is not possible. But 
theory not only fails to predict the performance of Leniency it also gets the effect of Bonus 
                                                           
25 Explicit collusion in naturally occurring markets appears to be feasible with large numbers of participants. For 
instance, in their study of 41 cartels in Europe, Levenstein and Suslow (2006) find that 18 involved more than 
five firms. 11 
 
wrong. Predicted to be the most effective remedy against collusion, Bonus, in fact, leads to 
prices which are as high as those seen in the Standard treatment. In addition, the Bonus 
treatment leads to the greatest incidence of cartel formation, while leniency has the least. The 
authors conjecture that subjects in the Bonus treatment are tempted to form a cartel with an 
agreement to set high prices, and then also being rewarded for reporting the cartel (although 
this strategy is not in fact profitable when all firms form a cartel with this intent). Apesteguia 
et al. conclude: “Our findings in this paper provide no reason for Gary Spratling and Mario 
Monti to feel disappointed with the leniency clauses that have recently been incorporated into 
the anti-trust legislation in most member states of the OECD.” 
 
While  Apesteguia  et  al.  study  a  one-shot  interaction,  Hinloopen  and  Soetevent  (2008) 
examine a setting where three firms repeatedly interact in the same market for 20 periods.  
(With a repeated interaction, firms may be more reluctant to report a cartel, since they then 
forgo the future benefits of collusion. In addition, even if cartel formation is impossible, there 
is the possibility of tacit collusion.) They report that leniency programs not only reduce the 
frequency with which cartels are formed but also reduce the stability of cartels that do get 
formed. Moreover, cartels that do get formed in the presence of the leniency programs charge 
relatively lower prices. Thus, both of these studies show that leniency programs, despite their 
potential weaknesses in theory, are successful in fighting cartels.  
 
3.  Imitative Behavior and Concerns for Relative Profit 
Rather than each firm laboriously calculating its own optimal strategy, even if that were 
feasible, it is plausible that firms may sometimes choose to imitate the strategies of their more 
successful peers. As Alchian (1950, page 218) put it: 
 
"[W]henever successful enterprises are observed, the elements common to 
these observable successes will also be associated with success and copied 
by others in their pursuit of profits or success. […] What would otherwise 
appear to be customary 'orthodox,' non-rational rules of behavior turns out to 
be codified imitations of observed success, e.g., 'conventional' markup, [..] 
'orthodox' accounting and operating ratios, 'proper' advertising policy, etc. " 
 
Alchian suggests that imitation enables firms to make use of other firms' private information 
and optimizing behavior, and to enjoy the benefits of conformity (as imitating firms are likely 
to do as well as the average of their peers).  To discuss these and other points further, it is 
useful  to  distinguish  between  imitation  by  non-rivalrous  firms  and  imitation  by  firms 
competing in the same market.  
 
Imitation by non-rivalrous firms: For now suppose that the relevant firms do not interact 
strategically in a market, e.g., they may be local monopolists, or they may be price-taking 
firms  facing  some  given  exogenous  price  (such  as  farmers  deciding  on  an  agricultural 
technique). It is plausible that "optimizing" and "imitating" firms might co-exist, and each 
firm chooses which of the two broad kinds of strategy to follow. If firms incur a cost for 12 
 
calculating the optimal action, then when most firms are optimizers and firms operate in a 
similar environment, it may pay a firm simply to copy these optimizing firms' actions and 
save  itself  the  calculation  cost.  Of  course,  if  too  many  firms  free-ride  and  copy  average 
observed behavior, there may re-emerge a benefit to investing in optimizing. Since optimizers 




In  other  situations,  firms  may  be  unsure  about  the  optimal  action  even  after  significant 
deliberation, and instead they may have access to a noisy private signal about what is the best 
action. If firms move sequentially, and can observe the actions chosen by earlier firms, then a 
(rational) firm should take into account what other firms did before choosing its own action. 
In such cases, there is a danger that firms will become locked into taking the wrong action.
27 
Such a framework might be used to explain inefficient technology adoption or merger waves 
by  profit-maximizing  firms.  However,  the  predicted  equilibrium  depends  on  very 
sophisticated reasoning by firms. (For instance, the third firm needs to work out what the 
second firm's action implies in terms of that firm's private signal, and the required "depth of 
reasoning"  gets progressively larger for firms  which are further back.)  In experiments, it 
appears that firms do not play the equilibrium, and instead put more weight on their private 
signal than they should.
28 This could be interpreted as a form of over-confidence, a topic to 
which we return in section 6. 
 
Career concerns of managers might give a reason why a manager mimics the action of a peer, 
even if there is no extra cost to calculating the optimal action from scratch. Scharfstein and 
Stein (1990) suggest a model with two managers (not competing in the same product market), 
each of whom may have private information about the desirability of choosing action X or 
action  Y.  One  manager  chooses  her  action  first,  and  the  other  then  chooses  after  taking 
account of the first decision. Managers are either "smart" (i.e., they have genuine information 
                                                           
26 See Conlisk (1980) for a model along these lines. The situation is somewhat related to Grossman and Stiglitz's 
(1976) analysis of the incentives for investors to become better informed about the return of an uncertain asset: 
if all investors choose to be better informed, the asset's price reflects the information, and there is no need for 
any individual investor to become informed if there is a cost to doing so. It is also related to Burdett and Judd's 
(1983) analysis of a consumer's incentive to search for a low price: if all consumers choose to search then the 
market is highly competitive, and there is then no need for any individual consumer to search if there is a cost to 
doing so. 
27 Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchandani et al. (1992) consider a situation in which similar agents need to decide 
between two options (say, whether to adopt technology X or technology Y), and each agent has a private signal 
about which option is better and can also observe the previous choices (but not the payoffs) made by other 
agents. (The order in which agents have to make their choice is pre-determined in these models.) Even if agents 
are completely rational, it is possible that they become locked into the wrong choice. For instance, if technology 
X is in fact superior, but by chance the first few agents have private signals which induce them to choose Y,  
then subsequent agents will infer that the superior action is likely to be Y despite their own private signals to the 
contrary.  (If  instead,  agents  could  observe  the  private  signals,  or  the  payoffs,  of  the  earlier  adopters,  this 
inefficient herding could not occur.)  
28 See Weizsacker (2008) for an analysis of data from several experiments on the Bikhchandani et al. (1992) 
model. 13 
 
about which strategy is better) or "dumb" (i.e., they know nothing), and managers do not 
know which type they are when they decide on their action. Since their private information is 
correlated,  a  pair  of  smart  managers  tends  to  choose  the  same  action.  Therefore,  if  a 
manager's subsequent career depends on whether or not she is perceived to be smart, the 
second manager has an incentive to imitate to the first so as to be considered smart, even if 
that means going against her own private information. As the authors put it (page 466): "an 
unprofitable decision is not as bad for reputation when others make the same mistake - they 
can  share  the  blame  if  there  are  systematically  unpredictable  shocks."  This  managerial 
herding is often socially inefficient.
29   
 
A model which several researchers have investigated supposes that each firm usually imitates 
its  best-performing  peer,  but  with  some  (perhaps  small)  probability  it  "experiments"  and 
chooses a random strategy. A firm - if it has access to the necessary information - can observe 
the actions and profits of the other firms, and when it next has the opportunity to change its 
own action it can choose the action of the most profitable firm. In a stable and symmetric 




Imitation  by  competing  firms:  Additional  effects  come  into  play  when  firms  are  rivals 
operating  in  the  same  market,  so  that  firms  compete  as  well  as  observe.
31  In  practice, 
oligopolists  may  have  little  idea  of  the  consumer  demand  function,  or  how  closely 
substitutable their rivals' products are with their own. Nevertheless, they may observe their 
rivals' actions and their rivals' realized profits. When oligopolists imitate the most profitable 
                                                           
29  The  authors  quote  Keynes  as  writing:  "Worldly  wisdom  teaches  that  it  is  better  for  reputation  to  fail 
conventionally than to succeed unconventionally." Tse and Tucker (2009) empirically investigate the timing of 
earnings warnings, and find that a manger is more likely to issue an earnings warning if a peer has done so in the 
previous  days.  They  conclude  that  the  data  is  better  explained  by  managers  attempting  to  maintain  their 
reputations than by the impact of a common shock, for instance. 
30 It is important that firms experiment occasionally, otherwise the process will grind to a halt after one period 
when all firm imitate the most profitable firm in the first period (which is unlikely to have chosen the optimal 
price immediately), and then all prices are  unchanged thereafter.  An alternative framework is presented in 
Ellison and Fudenberg (2003, section II), where firms choose between one of two technologies, and the relative 
payoff from using one technology rather than the other is uncertain. If in any period firms choose the technology 
which performed best in the previous period, then the chosen technology will flip over time depending on which 
one happened to work best one period earlier. Thus, instead of converging to the consistent use of the superior 
technology, the outcome is merely that the better technology is used more frequently. The authors go on to 
investigate less naïve rules of thumb - where a firm conditions its choice on how many firms use that technology 
- which have superior efficiency properties. (The reason why market shares matter for firms is that they reveal 
information  about  the  relative  performance  of  the  two  technologies  for  more  than  just  the  single  previous 
period.)   
31 Ridley (2008) analyzes a model in which a second firm sometimes decides to enter a market only if its rival 
has first entered, in order to save on the costs of acquiring its own market information. He provides some 
anecdotes about how competitors of McDonald's often locate near to a new McDonald's franchise, and he quotes 
a manager of a coffee shop chain as saying: "The reason we want to open across the street from every Starbucks 
is they do a great job at finding good locations."   14 
 
actions observed in the market, it is possible that the market moves over time to a highly 
competitive outcome (more competitive than the one-shot Nash equilibrium). To see this, 
consider  a  Cournot  market  where  several  firms  with  identical  constant  marginal  costs 
compete to supply a homogenous product. Suppose, whenever they have the opportunity to 
change their output, that firms imitate the output decision of the most profitable firm of the 
previous period.
 Then, when the market price is above cost the most profitable firm will be 
the  one  with  the  largest  output.  Hence,  firms  with  low  output  will  increase  their  output, 
imitating the profitable firm, which pushes the price down. (If price is below cost, the most 
profitable firm is the one with the smallest output, and so imitation will then drive prices up.) 
Thus,  imitation  pushes  prices  towards  cost  and  the  market  evolves  towards  the  perfectly 
competitive  outcome  where  price  equals  marginal  cost.  In  sum,  when  firms  myopically 
imitate the most profitable strategy, the industry as a whole moves to an unprofitable, highly 
competitive outcome. See Vega-Redondo (1997) for more details of this model, as well as 
Schaffer (1989) for a related model.
32 
 
Many markets are better modelled as firms choosing prices rather than quantities, and where 
firms  offer  differentiated  products.  In  these  markets,  imitation  can  also  induce  firms  to 
compete  aggressively,  although  not  to  the  extent  of  perfect  competition  as  seen  in  the 
(homogeneous product) Cournot case. To illustrate, consider a duopoly with firms labelled 1 
and 2, where if the two prices are p1  and p2 then firm 1's demand is  
1 2 1 1 /2 q p p = + -           (1) 
(and similarly for firm 2). For simplicity, suppose costs are normalized to zero. Then profit-
maximizing firms are predicted to choose the Bertrand equilibrium prices p1 = p2 = 2/3, and 
each firm sells quantity 2/3. One can check that when both prices are above 1/2 then the 
lower-price firm makes greater profit. (When both prices are below 1/2 then the higher-price 
firm has more profit.) Therefore, when the less profitable firm chooses the price of the more 
profitable firm, prices will converge over time to p1 = p2 = 1/2, so that the mark-up on cost 
falls by one-third with imitative behavior relative to profit-maximizing behavior. (See Rhode 
and Stegeman (2001) for more details.)  
 
An interesting corollary of imitative behavior is that the familiar distinction between price-
setting and quantity-setting behavior vanishes, and the long-run performance of markets with 
imitative firms does not depend on whether firms choose to compete in prices or in quantities. 
With profit-maximizing behavior, when firms compete in quantities the outcome differs - 
typically it is less competitive - from when they compete in prices. (For instance, in the linear 
demand example of the previous paragraph, when firms compete in quantities one can show 
that the equilibrium involves each firm setting the output 3/5, which induces each firm to set 
                                                           
32 Schlag (1998,1999) proposes an alternative model of imitation which yields a contrasting long-run prediction. 
In Schlag's model, there are many distinct oligopolies, a firm in one market imitates the best-performing firm in 
another oligopoly, not the best-performing rival in the same market (as in Vega-Redondo's model). The result of 
this alternative specification is that firms move towards the Cournot-Nash equilibrium rather than the perfectly 
competitive outcome. See Apesteguia, Huck and Oechssler (2007) for further discussion of the two approaches.  15 
 
the price 4/5, which is higher than when the firms compete in prices.) However, when firms 
choose quantities the process of imitation converges to the situation where each firm chooses 
output 3/4, which induces each firm to set the price 1/2, which is exactly the same as when 
firms chose prices.
33   
 
As discussed earlier in the context of non-rivalrous firms, it is natural to consider situations 
where  profit-maximizing  firms  compete  against  naïve  imitators  to  see  which  type  of 
behaviour performs better. Schipper (2009) investigates a Cournot model where "imitators" 
compete against "optimizers", where the latter firms are not really forward-looking profit-
maximizers but rather myopic, and choose their output in one period as the most profitable 
response to the previous period's outputs. He shows that imitators make greater long-run 
profits than optimizers. A sterner test of the benefits of naive imitation is when such a firm 
competes against firms who are forward-looking strategic players. It turns out that in a wide 
class of games, imitators do "essentially" as well as profit-maximizing rivals. For instance, 
consider  a  repeated  Prisoner's  Dilemma  in  which  one  firm  which  plays  the  "tit-for-tat" 
strategy, i.e., this firm starts off colluding, and the in each subsequent round it imitates the 
previous action of the rival. Then the profit-maximizing way to play against this imitator is to 
collude in all periods except the last (if there is a last period), when it is optimal to compete. 
The profit-maximizing firm therefore obtains identical profits to the imitator, except just for 
one period (if there is a last period) when it makes higher profit.
34  
 
Of course, firms can only imitate the most successful firm when they are provided with the 
necessary  market  information  (namely,  the  profits  of  each  firm,  together  with  individual 
outputs in the Cournot case). But as soon as this information is present, a process as described 
by  Vega-Redondo  can  make  markets  very  competitive.  As  discussed  in  section  2,  Vega-
Redondo’s  paper  has  inspired  several  experimental  tests  (Huck,  Normann,  and  Oechssler 
(1999,  2000),  Offerman,  Potters,  Sonnemans  (2002),  Apesteguia,  Huck,  and  Oechssler 
(2007)), all of which found some support for the basic qualitative prediction of the imitation 
model,  including  for  the  prediction  that  the  pro-competitive  impact  of  imitation  is  less 
pronounced  when  firms  choose  prices  rather  than  quantities.  (For  instance,  Huck  et  al. 
(1999),  in  their  treatment  denoted  "IMIT+"  where  firms  did  not  know  much  about  the 
functional forms of market demand or costs but did observe individual rival quantities and 
profits,  found  that  the  outcome  was  statistically  indistinguishable  from  the  perfectly 
competitive  outcome.)  Nevertheless,  the  perfectly  competitive  outcome  was  not  always 
achieved,  indicating  that  not  all  subjects  were  following  the  "imitate  the  best"  strategy. 
                                                           
33 See Tanaka (2000) and Rhode and Stegeman (2001) for a general argument. 
34 See Duersch, Oechssler and Schipper (2009) for further details about how imitators do almost as well against 
even the smartest opponents in a wide class of games. (This result is reminiscent of Axelrod's (1984) famous 
round-robin  contest  between  repeated  strategies  in  the  Prisoner's  Dilemma,  where  the  imitative  "tit-for-tat" 
strategy was found to outperform all other submitted strategies on average.) The main kind of game where 
imitators do poorly is something like "rock-paper-scissors", where a smart player can systematically trick the 
naïve  imitator  into  always  playing  the  wrong  action.  (These  kinds  of  games  are  not  common  in  market 
situations, however.)   16 
 
Offerman  et  al.  (page  989)  suppose  that  a  fraction  of  their  subjects  imitate,  while  the 
remainder are assumed to choose the most profitable output given the observed outputs of the 
previous period.  In their data, the best fit for this mixed model is that two thirds of the 
subjects are imitators. 
 
Concerns for relative profits: There is a close connection between situations in which firms 
imitate the best observed strategy played by their rivals and situations in which firms (or their 
managers) have as their objective the maximization of relative profits. The reason for this 
close connection is as follows. Consider the differentiated product duopoly just discussed, 
and suppose one firm reduces its price to undercut its rival. If the lower-price firm makes 
greater profit than its rival, this means that the price cut harms it less than it harms its rival, 
i.e.,  the  difference  between  its  profit  and  its  rival's  rises.  In  the  specific  linear  demand 
example, if both firms wish to maximize their relative profit, firm 1 chooses its price p1 to 
maximize the profit difference 
( ) ( ) 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 /2 1 /2 p p p p p p + - - + - , 
and it is therefore a dominant strategy for each firm to set the price 1/2, just as eventually 
occurred when firms imitate. Thus, the long-run outcome in markets in which firms imitate 
coincides with the (one-shot) outcome in markets in which firms are fully rational except that 
their objective is relative rather than absolute profit.  
 
The importance of this result is that, while perhaps purely imitative behavior on the part of 
sophisticated firms may seem unlikely in many markets, the assumption that firms care about 
their relative position in a market has strong intuitive appeal.
35 Firstly, there is by now no 
doubt that many individuals are strongly driven by relative pay. This is evident from the 
behavioral and experimental economics literature, as well as from the emerging happiness 
literature.
36 Indeed, CEOs as a group may have a greater proportion of "rivalrous" people 
than  the  population  as  whole,  and  such  people  may  place  great  weight  on  their  relative 
standing.  Secondly,  managers  often  have  placed  on  them  (either  explicitly  or  implicitly) 
incentives  which  induce  them  to  care  at  least  in  part  about  relative  as  well  as  absolute 
performance. (One reason for this might be to insure managers against common shocks for 
the whole market.) For instance, Gibbons and Murphy (1990) document empirically how a 
CEO's pay rise and likelihood of retention depend positively on the firm's performance and 
negatively on the overall industry performance. Vickers (1985, page 143) shows that a firm in 
a Cournot market can improve its equilibrium profits (both in absolute and relative terms) 
when  competing  against  profit-maximizing  firms  by  inducing  its  manager  to  care  about 
                                                           
35 Goel and Thakor (forthcoming) propose a model in which merger waves can be caused by concerns for 
relative compensation by CEOs. If CEO compensation is based in part on firm size, then if one merger occurs 
which boosts that CEO's pay, other CEO feel envious and set about finding their own take-over targets. 
36 For instance, see Clark et al. (2008). 17 
 
relative rather than absolute profit.
37 For the same reason, if potential managers differ in their 
intrinsic preferences for absolute or relative profit performance, Miller and Pazgal (2002) 
argue that a firm may wish to hire a manager with a behavioral bias towards relative profit so 
as to gain strategic advantage. 
 
So  far,  we  have  argued  that  imitation  or  concern  for  relative  profits  makes  the  static 
interaction between oligopolists more competitive, but what does this behavior imply for the 
sustainability of collusion? Suppose that each oligopolist cares about its profits relative to its 
rivals. Compared to the setting with absolute profit maximization, there are two effects: 
·  the static Nash equilibrium - which is used to punish firms if they deviate from the 
collusive agreement - is more competitive, but 
·  the short-run benefits to deviating are larger, since by undercutting its rivals a firm not 
only boosts its own profits but harms its rivals. 
The first effect makes collusion easier, while the second makes it harder, and a priori it is 
unclear which dominates. However, in a Cournot setting, Lundgren (1996) shows that when 
firms care purely about relative profit, collusion is impossible to sustain. 
 
We  can  summarise  this  discussion  in the  following  points.  In  markets  where  firms  offer 
substitute  products  (i.e.,  in  which  firms  compete),  the  market  is  made  more  competitive 
relative to the textbook situation when firms maximize their profits if firms either (i) imitate 
the  previous  most  profitable  strategies  or  (ii)  aim  to  maximize  their  relative  profits.  The 
(eventual) outcomes under scenarios (i) and (ii) coincide, and in both cases the outcome is the 
same whether firms compete in prices or quantities. In mixed settings, where imitators (or 
relative profit maximizers) compete against profit-maximizing firms, the former will often 
perform at least as well as the latter. 
 
4.  Vengeful Behavior and Esprit de Corps 
The  previous  section  discussed  situations  in  which  firms  and  their  managers  care  about 
relative rather than absolute performance. A loosely related issue is that firms may sometimes 
care when their rivals obtain an "unfair" share of industry profits, for instance by cheating on 
a collusive agreement.  
 
It  is  clear  that  many  people  are  willing  to  incur  costs  in  order  to  harm  others  who  are 
perceived  to  have  behaved  unfairly  towards  them,  a  phenomenon  which  could  be  called 
vengeance or spite. Among the most famous and robust experiments in economics are those 
that study the "ultimatum game".
38 Here, two players must share some specified prize, and 
one player (the "proposer") suggests a way to share the prize between the two players. If the 
                                                           
37  The  impact  of  making  the  firm  wish  to  maximize  relative  profit  is  that  the  firm  then  behaves  as  the 
Stackelberg leader, even though both firms in fact choose quantities simultaneously. It is important that rivals 
observe the incentive scheme so that they know the firm's objective and can react to it accordingly. 
38  See  Guth,  Schmittberger,  and  Schwarze’s  (1982)  path-breaking  experiment  and  the  many  papers  which 
followed. See Fehr and Schmidt (1999, Section IIIA) for a review of this literature. 18 
 
second  player  (the  "responder")  agrees  with  the  proposed  shares,  the  prize  is  divided 
accordingly,  while  if  the  responder  does  not  agree  then  neither  player  gets  anything.  If 
players were interested in obtaining as much of the prize as possible, the predicted outcome 
(from a one-shot interaction) is that the proposer offers only a tiny share to the responder, 
who accepts since she prefers a small positive payoff to nothing. However, it is commonly 
observed that the responder will reject offers she finds too small, e.g., less than 25% of the 
prize. Because of this, proposers learn or anticipate that it is too risky to make such unfair 
offers, and outcomes where the proposer offers the responder 40% or 50% are often the 
norm.
39 These experiments have been performed (in poorer countries) when the prize is very 
significant in terms of monthly salary, and the results were the same. 
 
The same effect is observed in markets. Huck, Muller, and Normann (2001) show that a firm 
with a theoretical commitment advantage (a Stackelberg leader in a Cournot market) finds it 
hard  to  exploit  that  advantage  in  experimental  markets.  The  reason  for  this  is  that  the 
theoretically  disadvantaged  firm  (the  Stackelberg  follower)  acts  more  aggressively  than 
predicted  by  the  subgame  perfect  equilibrium  of  these  market  games.  In  fact,  followers 
appear to punish the leader when the leader supplies a quantity above the symmetric Cournot 
quantity. (They punish the leader by themselves supplying a higher quantity than their most 
profitable  response  to  the  leader's  quantity.)  This  behavior  is  in  line  with  the  vengeful 
behavior  seen  in  the  ultimatum  game  when  the  proposer  tries  to  exploit  his  first-mover 
advantage. 
 
Similar behavioral effects are observed in experiments that study strategic delegation. As 
already  mentioned,  Vickers  (1985)  showed  theoretically  that  firm  owners  might  want  to 
employ managers simply for strategic reasons. By writing an appropriate incentive contract 
for  the  manager,  the  owner  can  in  effect  commit  his  firm  to  Stackelberg-like  aggressive 
behavior. However, if all firms do this a highly competitive outcome results: all firms are 
worse off than when managers cared solely about profit. Huck, Muller, and Normann (2004) 
test this theory in an experiment, and do not confirm its predictions. If an owner does offer 
his manager the aggressive contract (and other owners do not), then managers in the weaker 
position are not content with simply accepting their "equilibrium fate" which would give 
them a lower salary than their opponent. Rather they behave more aggressively, in line with 
the observed behavior of the Stackelberg followers in Huck, Muller, and Normann (2001).
40 
                                                           
39 The proposer might offer 40%-50% of the prize to the responder because he is purely self-interested and is 
afraid of lower offers being rejected by spiteful responders, or because he cares directly for fair allocations and 
is willing to sacrifice some of the prize to achieve a more equitable outcome. A variant of the ultimatum game - 
the dictator game  - can discriminate between  these two  hypotheses. The dictator game does not allow  the 
responder to reject the offer. Experimental comparisons of the two games reveal that offers are considerably less 
generous (and often zero) in the dictator game than in the ultimatum game, suggesting that generosity on the 
part of many proposers is purely strategic. See Forsythe et al. (1994) for more details. 
40 Fershtman and Judd (1987) and Sklivas (1987) consider the alternative situation where firms compete in 
prices rather than quantities. Because firms then compete using strategic complements, owners wish to give 
managers  an  incentive  scheme  which  depends  negatively  on  the  firm's  sales.  Even  if  all  firms  offer  this 
managerial contract, firms make higher profits than when managers simply maximize their profits. It would be 19 
 
This may mean that attempts to hire "behavioral" types of managers, as in Miller and Pazgal 
(2002), may also backfire. 
 
A natural question is whether "vengeance" might play a role in helping to sustain collusion. 
For  instance,  if  the  collusive  arrangement  (a  high  price  and  equal  market  shares)  is 
considered to represent the "fair" outcome, then if one firm reneges on the agreement and 
undercuts  the  price,  its  rivals  may  be  offended  and  hence  punish  the  deviator  especially 
aggressively  (even  at  extra  cost  to  themselves).  In  the  previous  section  we  argued  that 
concern for relative profits did not help sustain collusion, since it induced an extra benefit to 
deviating. But vengeance is subtly different from a concern for relative profit, since it only 
comes into effect when someone is treated unfairly. (There is no extra benefit from harming 
your rival, unless he has first harmed you.) Thus, because vengeance induces very aggressive 
punishments for deviating, it could help sustain collusion relative to situations in which firms 
care only about their own profits.
41  
 
While the previous section showed how concerns for relative performance could increase 
competitiveness  in  a  market  (benefiting  consumers),  these  examples  show  how  vengeful 
behavior can reduce competitiveness (to the detriment of consumers). In settings where firms 
are symmetrically positioned, concerns for relative profits increase competition. On the other 
hand,  in  environments  where  markets  are  predicted  to  be  particularly  competitive  due  to 
strategic asymmetries, vengeance against unfairly advantaged rivals tend to wipe out these 
advantages, rendering market outcomes more symmetric and less consumer-friendly. 
 
It is important to note that the impact of vengeful behavior is less likely to be present when 
agents are very asymmetric.
42 Thus, the potential for spiteful behavior may affect conduct 
between rival firms, but not so much between a firm and its consumers, for instance, or 
between a large supermarket and a small supplier. Consider modifying the ultimatum game 
so that there are many responders. (More precisely, the single proposer offers a share, and the 
various responders simultaneously decide whether to accept. If some responders accept, one 
is picked at random and given her offered share; if none accepts then no one gets anything.) 
Then orthodox theory predicts - and experiments confirm - that the single proposer will be 
able  to  offer  the  responders  very  little  and  still  find  a  willing  responder.  In  a  sense, 
competition forces the responders to act as if they were purely self-interested, so "vengeance" 
is a rent which competition dissipates.
43 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
interesting to run an experiment to test the prediction that these competitive-softening managerial contracts are 
offered. Since a rival is better off when a firm gives its manager a competition-softening contract, there seems 
less reason why "vengeance" should play a role. 
41 See Iris and Santos-Pinto (2009) for a model along these lines. However, we are aware of no experimental test 
of this hypothesis. 
42 For instance, if the ultimatum game is modified so that the proposer has first to run round a running track, or 
if the proposer is chosen by his performance in a general knowledge quiz, then the responder may feel that the 
proposer "owns" the initial stake, and so be more willing to accept a lower share of the prize. 
43 See Sections IIIB and IIIC of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) for further details and references. 20 
 
 
While vengeful behavior may sometimes be a way to sustain collusion, an alternative method 
is  to  foster  a  sense  of  loyalty,  of  esprit  de  corps,  amongst  the  conspirators.  Although 
information sharing is an important ingredient for collusive schemes to work, a useful by-
product of regular meetings is that loyalty and friendship may be inculcated, which may 
make it psychologically hard to cheat on agreements. Moreover, since illegal cartels cannot 
enforce  agreements  with  legally  binding  contracts,  trust  plays  a  central  role  in  their 
operation.
44  (Recall  from  section  2  that  face-to-face  communication  seemed  to  foster 
collusion more effectively than computer-mediated communication.) An important role for 
antitrust,  via  leniency  programmes  and  the  like,  is  indeed  to  foster  distrust  between 
conspirators. 
 
A  clear  example  of  an  attempt  to  run  a  cartel  (or  cartel-like  operation)  by  means  of 
encouraging a sense of esprit de corps is the US steel industry during the years 1907-1911, in 
which cooperation was fostered through a series of social events and meetings which have 
become known as the "Gary Dinners" after the chairman of U.S. Steel, Judge Elbert Gary. It 
is worth quoting one of Gary's speeches at length (see Page, 2009, page 608): 
 
"[W]e have something better to guide and control us in our business methods 
than a contract which depends upon written or verbal promises with a penalty 
attached. We as men, as gentleman, as friends, as neighbors, having been in 
close communication and contact during the last few years, have reached a 
point where we entertain for one another respect and affectionate regard. We 
have reached a position so high in our lines of activity that we are bound to 
protect one another; and when a man reaches a position where his honor is at 
stake, where even more than life itself is concerned, where he cannot act or 
fail to act except with a distinct and clear understanding that his honor is 
involved, then he has reached a position that is more binding on him than any 
written or verbal contract."   
 
In essence, if conspirators can find a way to increase the social or psychological cost of 
cheating, collusion will be more readily achieved. 
 
5.  Satisfactory, not Maximum, Profits 
Rather than denying the importance of (absolute) profits, one might instead question whether 
firms really maximize profits. For reasons of complexity, ignorance, or the "easy life", firms 
might instead engage in satisficing behavior to secure a target level (or "aspiration level") of 
profit. In its starkest form, the utility of a firm then has just two values: good enough, and not 
good enough. This idea goes back at least to Rothschild (1947), Gordon (1948) and Simon 
                                                           
44 See Levenstein and Suslow (2006) and, especially, Leslie (2004) for further discussion of these points and 
many examples of the role of trust and distrust in cartel stability. 21 
 
(1955).
45 Just as a consumer might not change her bank, say, until the perceived level of 
service quality she receives falls below some threshold, a firm might not revise its strategy 
while it continues to obtain satisfactory profits. Only if the realized profit falls below the 
target level will a firm resort to experimenting with an alternative strategy. Such behavior 
could give rise to a degree of price rigidity for instance, even if underlying cost or demand 
conditions vary.
46 The form of the experimentation could be purely random in extreme cases, 
or firms may be able to target their attention towards new strategies which will likely boost 
profits. (For instance, an idea in the early literature on saticificing was that firms often had a 
degree of "managerial slack", and when times were hard they could focus their energies on 
cutting  costs  or  expanding  their  markets.)  What  level  of  profits  a  firm  considers  to  be 
"satisfactory" is likely to depend on its historical returns as well as the performance of its 
peers and the economy as a whole.  
 
Cyert and March (1956) discuss some implications of satisficing behavior and test these ideas 
empirically analysing data from (a few) manufacturers of farm implements. They conclude 
that a firm is more likely to resort to aggressive strategies (seeking cost reductions or sales 
expansions) if it is operating close to its breakeven point or if its costs are higher than the 
industry average, behavior which accords with the idea that firms are most likely to change 
strategy after they realize low profits.  
 
Huck,  Konrad,  Muller,  and  Normann  (2007)  document  related  effects  in  an  experiment 
concerning mergers in Cournot markets. As is known since Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds 
(1983), bilateral mergers in linear Cournot markets with more than two firms are predicted to 
reduce the joint profits of merging firms when firms are fully profit-maximizing. Since this 
prediction  appears  counterintuitive  at  first  sight,  the  result  has  been  dubbed  the  "merger 
paradox". The intuition for the result is simple, however. In Cournot markets firms’ outputs 
exert negative externalities on their rivals. Hence, after a merger the two insiders have an 
incentive to internalize some of these negative externalities, that is, they have an incentive to 
reduce their combined output. (Obviously, they would keep their pre-merger profits if they 
simply kept their output constant, but this is not the most profitable  response to the un-
merged firms' outputs.) Further, as Cournot interactions are games with strategic substitutes, 
the un-merged firms’ optimal responses to this contraction in output is to increase their own 
outputs. This leads into a new equilibrium where the market price is higher, the outsiders are 
better off, and the two  merging insiders are worse off. The reduced market share of the 
                                                           
45 For instance, Gordon (1948, page 271) writes "The fear of bankruptcy and the even more widespread fear of 
temporary  financial  embarrassment  are  probably  more  powerful  drives  than  the  desire  for  the  absolute 
maximum in profits. […] Given the fog of uncertainty within which [the businessman]  must operate, the limited 
number of variables his mind can juggle at one time, and his desire to play safe, it would not be at all surprising 
if he adopted a set of yardsticks that promised reasonably satisfactory profits". 
46  Simon  (1979,  page  495)  makes  a  joke  about  those  economists  who  believe  that  departures  from  the 
predictions  of  rational  behavior  do  not  matter  if  the  predictions  of  the  standard  models  are  good  enough: 
"economists who are zealous in insisting that economic agents maximize turn around and become satisficers 
when the evaluation of their own theories is concerned." 22 
 




Huck  et  al.  test  this  prediction  in  laboratory  markets  with  initially  three  or  four  firms. 
Mergers  are  implemented  exogenously  after  25  periods  in  which  firms  learn  to  play  the 
Cournot equilibrium. Firms are randomly selected to merge and then play for a further 25 
periods. The merged firm is managed by one of the two subjects playing the role of the two 
merging firms. Profits are shared equally between the manager-owner and the passive owner. 
After the merger, profit-maximizing firms are predicted to behave as if one of the firms had 
vanished. (A merger in such a market is equivalent to the exit of one firm.) However, a clear 
pattern emerges in the laboratory: the merged firm systematically supplies more than the 
outsiders. (The outsiders are seen to respond approximately optimally to the behavior of the 
merged firm.) This implies that the losses from the merger are smaller than predicted. In fact, 
in the larger market (i.e., with four firms initially present) the merged firms do not lose at all. 
Rather, they experience an increase in profits for a few periods and then, when the outsiders 
are fully adjusted, they simply maintain the pre-merger profit level. 
 
Huck et al. discuss a number of reasons for this effect, and by conducting suitable control 
experiments  they  argue  that  something  akin  to  satisficing  behavior  is  the  most  likely 
explanation for observed behavior.
48 After two firms merge, the firms perceive the danger 
that their joint profits fall, and pursue aggressive strategies to avoid this (as the firms in Cyert 
and March did). The result is that the merged firm's output is significantly higher than its 
rivals'  outputs,  even  though  post-merger  a  merged  firm  and  an  unmerged  firm  are  in  a 
symmetric position. (However, the merger firm's output is lower than their combined outputs 
in the pre-merger phase, and so their strategies are not entirely inert.)  
 
An interesting application of satisficing behavior is discussed by Dixon (2000) and Oechssler 
(2002). They consider a number of oligopolies (rather than just one), and suppose that firms 
follow the following rule of thumb: "if my profits are no lower than the average profits 
observed across all markets,  I keep my strategy  unchanged; if my profits are lower than 
average profits across all markets, I experiment and choose a random strategy." Thus, firms 
use  the  average  payoff  of  all  firms  as  their  aspiration  level.  Such  a  policy  requires 
information about average profitability in these markets, but no information about individual 
firm actions or about consumer demand. It turns out that when firms behave in this manner 
(with  a  small  amount  of  noise  added)  then  behavior  in  each  market  eventually  becomes 
collusive. Consequently, practices that may look innocent from the orthodox point of view – 
                                                           
47 The prediction is typically reversed when firms have differentiated products and compete in prices - see 
Deneckere and Davidson (1985). 
48 Levin (1990) presents a related theoretic analysis of mergers in Cournot markets, in which he allows that a 
merged firm changes its behavior from a Cournot-Nash player to a Stackelberg player (among other possible 
behavioral changes), in which case a merger becomes profitable. 23 
 
myopic adjustments towards better strategies – may lead to undesirable outcomes. There can 
be collusive effect without any collusive intent.
49  
 
To understand this surprising result, consider for simplicity a pair of identical duopolies (i.e., 
there are four firms in all), which interact over time in a Prisoner's Dilemma manner using the 
two  possible  actions  of  "compete"  or  "collude".  Suppose  first  that  both  duopolies  are 
currently colluding, in which case all firms are satisfied with their profits. Next, imagine one 
firm "trembles" and changes its strategy to "compete". A duopoly in which both firms collude 
has higher profits than a duopoly where one firm colludes and the other competes, and so 
both firms in the colluding duopoly remain satisfied with their profits and do not experiment. 
The only firm dissatisfied with its profit is the colluding firm playing against the competing 
firm, which will experiment and end up playing "compete". We then have two firms in a 
market  playing  "compete",  both  of  whom  will be  dissatisfied  with  their  profits,  and  will 
experiment and end up both playing "collude". Thus all firms colluding is the stable steady 




A concept related to saticificing behavior is "approximately" optimal behavior. Firms may 
not find it worthwhile to calculate their optimal strategy precisely, but instead to cease their 
search for a good strategy when they get to within some tolerance of the optimal strategy. In 
technical terms, the outcome of approximately optimal behavior is termed an "ε-equilibrium", 
where ε > 0 is the (perhaps small) tolerance which firms have for shortfall in optimal profits. 
An important insight is that even a small tolerance by firms for sub-optimal strategies - that 
is, a small departure from fully optimizing behavior - can result in significant departures from 
outcomes industry profits and consumer welfare. (In the neighborhood of a firm's optimal 
strategy its profits are roughly flat, and so a moderate change in its strategy might have little 
impact on its own profit, and yet could have a significant impact on its rivals' profits and 
strategies.)  
 
To illustrate, consider two symmetric firms supplying a homogeneous product engaged in 
quantity competition. To be concrete, suppose that the consumer demand curve is q(p) = 1 - p 
and that production is costless. Then the symmetric fully collusive outcome in this market 
involves each firm supplying quantity 1/4 inducing the monopoly price p = 1/2. How small 
                                                           
49 An alternative adjustment mechanism which does not require any information about rival actions or profits, or 
indeed about the demand and cost functions, but which may nevertheless lead again to collusive outcomes, is 
discussed by Huck, Normann and Oechssler (2004b). They consider the rather natural rule of thumb: “if your 
last increase in output [or price] increased your profit, increase your output [or price] again; if your last increase 
in output [or price] decreased your profit, now decrease your output [or price]”. They show that if firms are 
constrained to change their strategy at a fixed rate over time, then the market moves towards the collusive 
outcome.  
50 It would be interesting to carry out experiments to test this prediction. Subjects could be divided into a 
number of separate oligopolies, and the average profitability in each round of interaction reported. It seems 
plausible that firms who perform below the norm may choose to revise their current strategies while above-
average firms maintain the same strategy. 24 
 
can a firm's tolerance for sub-optimal behavior be for the monopoly outcome to be an ε-
equilibrium? The most profitable response to the rival's monopoly output of 1/4 is to supply 
output 3/8 rather than 1/4. However, its gain in profit from pursuing the optimal strategy 
rather than the satisficing strategy of supplying output 1/4 is only 1/64. Thus, the collusive 
outcome (where each firm supplies quantity 1/4) is an ε-equilibrium provided that ε > 1/64. 
Note that 1/64 is about 6% of a firm's share of the monopoly profit, and so if firms are 
prepared to optimize to within 6% of their exact optimal profits, the monopoly outcome can 
be sustained without any collusive intent.
51  
 
Baye and Morgan (2004) present an interesting account of how almost-optimal behavior can 
lead to significant departures from the predictions of fully-optimal models. They analyze a 
static homogenous product Bertrand market, so that profit-maximizing firms are predicted to 
set  prices  at  marginal  cost.  They  obtain  an  ε-equilibrium  involving  mixed  strategies  for 
choosing prices which yields relatively high profits even for small ε. (With duopoly, when ε 
is just 1% of monopoly profit, the ε-equilibrium yields expected profit which is more than 
25% of the monopoly profit.) Baye and Morgan also discuss an alternative model of bounded 
rationality, which is that firms play a so-called quantal-response equilibrium.
52 This model 
supposes that a firm is more likely to choose a price which yields higher profit, but is not sure 
to choose the most profitable price. (This model nests the fully rational model and a model 
with purely random behavior as special cases.) While the details of the equilibria in the two 
models  of  bounded  rationality  differ,  the  broad  conclusions  -  that  prices  are  above  cost, 
profits  are  positive,  and  profits  fall  with  more  rivals  -  coincide.  Baye  and  Morgan  run 
laboratory experiments to generate data, and then estimate which model of firm behavior best 
fits the data. Especially for duopoly, they find that both the ε-equilibrium and the quantal-
response equilibrium model fit the data better than either of the extreme fully-rational or 
fully-random models. (There does not seem to be much to choose between the two boundedly 
rational models, however.) 
 
6.  Other Topics 
 
Over-Optimism: As is well-documented in the psychology literature, over-optimism (or over-
confidence)  about  one's  own  ability  or  about  the  probability  of  favorable  outcomes  is 
apparently common in the population.
53 Adam Smith wrote: "the chance of gain is by every 
man more or less over-valued, and the chance of loss is by most men under-valued". There 
                                                           
51 See Ellison (2006, pages 170-171). Note that if there are n firms instead of just two, the monopoly outcome 
can be implemented as an ε-equilibrium provided that ε > (n-1)
2/(16n
2), and so with more firms it does become 
harder to sustain the monopoly outcome with satisficing behavior. Relatedly, approximately optimal behavior by 
firms can sustain tacit collusion when they interact only finitely often, at least for the early periods of the 
interaction. (In simple models, fully rational firms cannot sustain any collusion when they meet a known, finite 
number of times.) See Radnor (1980) for further details. 
52 See McKelvey and Palfrey (1995) for further details of this form of approximately optimal behavior. 
53 For example, Svenson (1981) finds that 93% of respondents report that they are above the median in terms of 
driving ability. 25 
 
are  good  reasons  for  thinking  it  is  still  more  common  among  businesspeople  than  the 
population as whole. There is a "winner's curse" aspect to launching a new business: it is 
likely  that  others  have  already  thought  about  launching  a  similar  product  (be  it  a  new 
restaurant in a particular locale, or something more ambitious), and the entrepreneur who 
actually decides to start the new business is likely to be more optimistic than others. As a 
result, even if beliefs about the likely return from the investment are un-biased on average, 
the entrepreneur will typically be overly optimistic. Unless entrepreneurs rationally take full 
account of the fact that others have decided not to enter this market, we expect to see: (i) high 




Internal promotion procedures may also have a tendency to favour the over-optimistic, so that 
CEOs  as  well  as  entrepreneurs  may  be  disproportionately  over-optimistic.  Consider  a 
situation where management promotions are driven through rank-order tournaments, as in 
Lazear and Rosen (1981). To be promoted to a higher level, managers tend to require both 
skill and luck.  In  Lazear and Rosen’s original  model luck was  exogenous noise, but the 
model can be extended so that managers can affect the riskiness of projects they undertake. 
The consequence is that that the best performing manager in a tournament is likely to have 
high skill and to have chosen a risky set of projects. Overoptimism in a manager might mean 
that that manager downplays the true riskiness of projects. In this setting, managers who rise 
to the top of a firm are likely to be the highly-skilled optimists who were lucky.
55  
 
Using a more abstract selection mechanism, Heifetz, Shannon and Spiegel (2007) also argue 
that optimists will systematically outperform realists in competitive environments, and so will 
predominate in the pool of successful agents. The key intuition is that optimism can serve as 
a commitment device if observed by rivals (much as making a manager maximize relative 
profits does in Vickers (1985)). Translated into a market context, Heifetz et al.’s analysis 
suggests  that  particular  forms  of  managerial  over-optimism  may  sometimes  act  to  soften 
competition. For instance, consider a Bertrand oligopoly with differentiated products where 
there is some uncertainty about demand. The more optimistic a manager is - say, about the 
scale of demand, or the extent of product differentiation between suppliers - the higher the 
price she will charge. If a manager’s optimism is observable or if competitors at least have 
some informative signal about her degree of optimism, they will rationally anticipate these 
higher prices and optimally adjust their own prices upwards as well. Hence, one optimist is 
enough to increase the prices charged by all firms. And crucially the optimist will earn more 
                                                           
54 See De Meza and Southey (1996) for empirical evidence and a model which predicts that entrepreneurs are 
more optimistic than the general population. Camerer and Lovallo (1999) document in an experimental study 
showing that excessive entry can be driven by overconfidence in own ability. See Tor (2002) for an extended 
discussion of behavioral economics and entry decisions, and the implications for competition policy. 
55 See Goel and Thakor (2000) for a model along these lines. 26 
 




In what is perhaps the best-known paper about managerial irrationality, Roll (1986) suggests 
that  excessive  merger  activity  may  be  generated  by  managerial  over-confidence.  In  his 
theory,  a  CEO  is  too  confident  in  the  accuracy  of  his  information  about  the  potential 
profitability of a takeover, and so will be too quick to launch a takeover bid. Predictions of 
this theory are that the combined gain to bidder and target will be zero, and that the bidder's 
value  will  fall  on  announcement  of  the  bid.  Roll  suggests  that  the  available  empirical 
evidence does not reject these predictions. Overconfidence by CEOs in their ability to choose 
investment projects and merger opportunities has been detected by Malmendier and Tate 
(2005, 2008). CEOs will differ in the extent of their overconfidence, and Malmendier and 
Tate identify as overconfident those CEOs who hold on to their stock options until they 
expire. They interpret this as evidence of the CEO's over-estimation of their firm's future 
performance.  They  show  that  this  group  of  CEOs  are  55%  more  likely  to  undertake  a 
merger.
57 Managerial overconfidence could therefore be one explanation for why companies 
which undertake mergers seem to under-perform. 
 
There is also a rich literature in finance about whether overconfident securities traders can 
survive in the long term, or whether, a la Friedman (1953), they are driven out by more 
rational traders. If an overconfident trader underestimates the riskiness of an asset, she will 
buy more of the asset than rational traders. If the risky asset also has higher expected return, 
then the overconfident traders can become wealthier than more rational investors (although 
their expected utility is lower).
58 If an overconfident trader believes that her estimate of the 
expected return of a risky asset is more precise than it really is, such a trader will trade more 
aggressively than an unbiased trader, and since she trades based on useful information, her 
expected wealth is higher than unbiased traders (although her expected utility is lower). As a 
result, overconfident traders can persist in, and even dominate, the market.
59 Kyle and Wang 
(1997) present a model with just two traders, one of whom is overconfident and known to be 
so by the rational trader. They show, in a very similar manner to our previous discussion 
about Heifetz et al., that the overconfident trader gains strategic advantage by being known to 
trade aggressively, which induces the rational trader to scale back her own trades. The result 
is that the overconfident trader performs better than the rational trader. 
  
                                                           
56 See Englmaier (2007) for such a model. In a Cournot market, hiring a manager who is overoptimistic (say, 
about the scale of market demand) again confers strategic advantage to the firm, but if all firms do this they will 
all be worse off relative to the situation with unbiased managers.  
57 This correlation between holding onto stock options and corporate behavior could also be due to the CEO's 
inside information. However, Malmendier and Tate argue that this is unlikely to be the explanation since the 
CEOs who hold onto their stock options do not gain money from doing so.  
58 See De Long  et al. (1991) for more details. 
59 See Hirshleifer and Luo (2001). 27 
 
Accounting Anomalies: It is a fundamental tenet of profit-maximizing behavior that fixed and 
sunk costs, while they are important for entry and exit decisions, should not play a role for 
determining prices to customers. However, this policy is widely flouted by managers. Long 
ago, Hall and Hitch (1939) interviewed 38 business executives about their methods for setting 
prices. Instead of equating marginal revenue to marginal cost, they concluded that: "… there 
is a strong tendency among business men to fix prices directly at a level which they regard as 
their 'full cost'." Al-Najjar, Baliga, and Besanko (2008) describe a number of more recent 
surveys which report similar attitudes amongst managers, the majority of whom claim to take 
fixed  and  sunk  costs  into  account  when  setting  prices.  (They  also  report  a  managerial 
accounting textbook which argues against basing prices on marginal costs.)   
 
Experimental work confirms that supposedly irrelevant sunk costs can have an impact on 
how  prices  are  actually  chosen.  Offerman  and  Potters  (2006)  conduct  an  experiment  to 
investigate pricing in a Bertrand-type duopoly market with product differentiation. In one 
treatment,  there  are  no  sunk  costs  and  pricing  behavior  is  observed  to  converge  to  the 
Bertrand equilibrium. In a second treatment, participants must pay a sunk entry fee to join the 
market. (This is designed to model auctioning a licence for the right to enter a market.) In this 
second treatment, the average mark-up of prices over marginal cost is substantially higher 
(30% higher) than in the first treatment. Interestingly, when they perform the same pair of 
experiments but with monopoly instead of oligopoly, there is no impact of sunk costs on the 
chosen monopoly price (which is observed to be close to the profit-maximizing level). This is 
somewhat reminiscent of our discussion of communication costs in section 2, where we saw 
that firms were more inclined to stick to a non-binding collusive agreement if they incurred 
substantial costs to reach that agreement. 
 
This observation is consistent with Al-Najjar et al., who present a theoretical model to show 
how the use of full-cost pricing policies might persist in the long-run in oligopoly markets. 
The main result is by now a familiar one in this survey: by introducing a behavioral bias in 
managerial decision-making a firm can gain strategic advantage. In more detail, Al-Najjar et 
al. suppose that firms compete in a Bertrand market with product differentiation. In such a 
market, if a manager somehow commits to set a high price, its rivals will also set a high price, 
and  all  firms  will  make  higher  profits.
60  (The  effect  is  akin  to  hiring  an  overoptimistic 
manager, or placing a suitable incentive scheme on the manager, as previously discussed.) 
But a manager who bases prices in part on fixed and sunk costs in effect commits to set a 
                                                           
60 A numerical example may help to fix ideas. Suppose there is a duopoly with differentiated products where the 
two firms choose prices and where a firm's demand is given by expression (1) as in section 3. But instead of 
profit-maximizing behavior, suppose that firm i = 1,2 behaves as if its marginal cost is ci  rather than the true 
cost (which is zero). Suppose that far-sighted share-holders of firm i (or some form of evolutionary pressures) 
choose so as to maximize their true profits a corporate culture such that their manager behaves as if her cost was 
ci,  and  both  groups  of  share-holders  do  this  before  price  competition  starts.  Then  one  can  show  that  the 
equilibrium "costs" are c1 = c2 = 1/11, and costs are artificially boosted so as to raise equilibrium prices. In this 
example, prices rise by approximately 10% relative to the situation in which managers base their prices on the 
true marginal costs. 28 
 
high price, and so hiring a manager who practices this "naïve" pricing policy (or instilling a 
corporate culture where this form of pricing is used) boosts the firm's profits.
61 The effect is 
akin to the strategic tax policy analyzed by Eaton and Grossman (1986), where a country has 
an incentive to tax the output of a home firm in order to relax competition with a foreign 
rival.  
 
Other  alleged  accounting  "anomalies"  might  be  explained  by  similar  myopic  learning  or 
evolutionary  pressures,  or  reasons  of  strategic  delegation.  For  instance,  a  firm  might  be 
organized into separate profit centres, each of which is given the task of maximizing its own 
profit (despite the competitive or contracting externalities which might exist between these 
profit  centres).  Thus,  a  manufacturer  might  choose  to  supply  its  products  through  an 
independent retailer rather than sell directly to consumers via an integrated retailer.  To see 
one reason why this might be so, despite the apparent dangers of double marginalization, 
suppose that two manufacturers are competing to sell to consumers. If they sell directly to 
consumers,  then  in  the  absence  of  collusion  we  expect  to  see  the  Bertrand  equilibrium 
emerge. However, if each firm delegates its retailing operation to a separate division (and 
each retailing division sees the terms at which the rival retailer sources its product), then by 
setting a wholesale price above its production cost a firm can induce its retailing division to 
price high, which softens competition and boosts profits.
62 
 
Uncertainty about the Rationality of Rivals: Even if a firm is itself fully rational, its behavior 
will be affected when it believes that its rivals may not be rational. Because of this, a rational 
firm may have an incentive to mimic non-rational behavior so as to make its rival think it 
may be a non-rational type of firm. Consequently, even the potential for behavioral biases can 
have a substantial effect on market outcomes. 
 
As we have discussed already, if two rational firms (who know for sure that each other is 
rational) play a Prisoner's Dilemma game for a known finite number of rounds, with the two 
actions "collude" and "compete", there is no way to sustain collusion even at the start. But if 
one firm is unsure about the rationality of its rival, it may be unwise to "compete" in each 
round. For instance, suppose the rival is for some reason believed to be using the strategy of 
"tit-for-tat", i.e., this rival starts off colluding, and the in each subsequent round it imitates the 
previous action of the rival. (Note that the "tit-for-tat" strategy cannot be a rational strategy 
for a profit-maximizing firm, since in the final round it is a dominant strategy to "compete" 
regardless of the rival's penultimate action.) If one firm thinks it is playing against a "tit-for-
tat" firm, it will typically be optimal to collude for initial periods so as to induce the rival to 
continue with collusion. Only toward the endpoint will the rational firm start to compete. 
Note that it may therefore be profitable for one firm to commit to play "tit-for-tat" against a 
                                                           
61 Al-Najjar et al. suppose that the oligopolists reach equilibrium prices via a myopic adjustment process, and 
this means that rivals do not need to observe the "bias" of the manager. In addition, they assume that each firm 
observes only its own profits and not the profits of its rivals, and are more likely to choose cost methodologies 
which are performed well for it in the past. 
62 See Bonanno and Vickers (1988) for this model. 29 
 
profit-maximizing opponent, if feasible, so as to enjoy some rounds of collusion. However, it 
may not be possible to commit to an irrational strategy. An alternative is for one or both 
players to mimic the behavior of "tit-for-tat", so as to induce the rival to believe she is more 
likely to be this irrational type. This too will induce collusive behavior for some rounds.
63 
Thus, the (perhaps small) possibility that one or both agents is irrational can induce play 
which is better for both agents (and worse for consumers).
64  
 
Another way in which a rational firm might wish to mimic an irrational firm is in the context 
of predatory pricing. If an monopoly incumbent faces a sequence of potential entrants to its 
market, it may wish to establish a reputation for "fighting" entry whenever it occurs, even 
when "fighting" is actually more costly than "accommodating" entry.
65 The predictions of the 
Kreps-Wilson  model  of  predatory  pricing  are  broadly  (i)  there  is  little entry  in  the  early 
period, (ii) when there is entry in early periods, the incumbent "fights" even if it is a rational 
firm, and (iii) towards the endpoint there is more entry and less willingness to fight on the 
part of the rational incumbent. This model, which involves highly sophisticated reasoning on 
the part of firms, is tested in an experiment by Jung et al. (1994). The experiment found 
widespread predatory pricing - defined to be either no entry in the early stages, or a rational 
incumbent fighting entry if it does occur in the early stages - although some of the more 
detailed  predictions  of  the  Kreps-Wilson  model  did  not  fit  the  data.  (For  instance, 
experimental  subjects  did  not  enter  more  frequently  if  there  had  been  no  previous  entry 
compared to if there had been entry which had been fought, whereas the Kreps-Wilson model 
predicts there should be more entry in the former case.) 
 
7.  Discussion 
This paper has discussed a number of reasons why firms might not pursue maximum profits: 
 
1.  In some complex, uncertain environments, the optimization problem is simply too 
hard,  and  firms  must  resort  instead  to  satisficing  and  the  use  of  rules  of  thumb. 
Particular decision shortcuts included imitating the actions of well-performing peers, 
being content to achieve profits to within "ε" of the maximum, or continuing to move 
in a particular direction if that direction proved profit-enhancing in the past. In some 
situations, such as herding or collusion between many firms, the complex strategies 
needed to maximize profits are rarely observed in laboratory settings. 
2.  Alternatively,  optimization  might  still  occur,  but  with  alternative  aims  or  under 
mistaken beliefs. Thus, a manager might maximize her profits relative to those of her 
peers, or a manager could be over-optimistic about the profitability of some action. 
The reason why managers have aims different from maximizing profits could be due 
to selection effects (e.g., only "competitive" or over-optimistic people rise to become 
                                                           
63 See Kreps et al. (1982) for this model. 
64 However, note that if the potential irrationality took a different form then collusion might not be sustained. 
For instance, if the irrational player has a strategy of always colluding, then a rational player's best response to 
this is to always defect (just as if she were playing against a rational agent). 
65 See Kreps and Wilson (1982) for this model. 30 
 
CEOs, or because firms which aim to maximize their relative standing actually obtain 
greater  absolute  profits  than  their  profit-maximizing  rivals),  or  because  profit-
maximizing  principals  choose  to  give  their  managers  distorted  incentives  to  gain 
strategic advantage. 
3.  "Social" preferences (other than caring about relative profit as above) may play a role, 
and  a  firm  might  punish  a  rival  if  that  rival  obtains  an  "unfair"  share  of  profits. 
Alternatively,  face-to-face  communication  between  firms  may  generate  solidarity 
amongst conspirators which makes it hard to cheat on collusive agreements. 
 
In some situations, markets are more competitive when firms cannot - or do not aim to - 
maximize their profits. For example, if firms in a market myopically imitate the action of the 
most profitable rival, then the market may paradoxically move towards a highly competitive 
outcome. Alternatively, we saw at least in laboratory settings that firms were often unable to 
achieve tacit collusion, despite this being an equilibrium option for profit-maximizing firms. 
Some of the more complex strategies that foster collusion in theory are perhaps too subtle to 
matter empirically. 
 
In other situations, when firms cannot - or do not aim to - maximize profits, their realised 
profits  are  actually  increased.  This  can  be  clearly  seen  in  the  case  of  static  Bertrand 
competition with homogenous products. Here, the only equilibrium involves firms setting 
prices  equal  to  marginal  costs,  leaving  them  with  no  profits.  But  if  satisficing  firms  are 
content to choose actions which are only approximately optimal, then they may all be able to 
enjoy substantial profits. Likewise, when satisficing firms alter their actions only when they 
under-perform  relative  to  average  performance,  the  result  may  be  as  if  firms  were 
successfully colluding.  
 
In some cases, if a firm adopts a non-standard objective, it will gain strategic advantage in the 
market. For instance, a firm which aims to maximize its relative profits may do better in 
equilibrium than a profit-maximizing rival. Or a firm which chooses to base its price on "full 
costs" rather than marginal costs may do better than if it followed textbook profit-maximizing 
precepts. Through commitments to deviate from profit maximization, competitors’ behavior 
will change in a desirable way. These non-standard objectives could be put in place by far-
sighted profit-maximizing shareholders (as emphasized in the strategic delegation literature) 
or,  more  relevant  for  the  purposes  of  this  survey,  they  could  arise  myopically  due  to 
evolutionary selection of better performing managers and/or firms.
66  
 
Thus we see there are several situations in which Friedman's (1953) critique of non-profit 
maximizing behaviour appears to fail. Nevertheless, there are a number of situations in which 
market competition and market experience seem to diminish those behavioral biases which 
do not confer evolutionary advantage. For instance, we saw that competitive versions of the 
                                                           
66 However, as discussed in section 3, the effect may be limited if rivals react punitively when one firm puts in 
place an aggressive manager or an incentive scheme which induces aggressive behaviour by its manager. 31 
 
ultimatum  game  appear  in  experiments  to  conform  to  more  orthodox  models  of  selfish 
behavior. In addition, as shown in the work of List (2003, 2004), market experience can 
dampen the bias known as the endowment effect, where the valuation of a good increases 
when it is owned. Such a bias cannot easily improve own performance in markets with many 
traders (rather it hinders agents from making otherwise beneficial trades). Likewise, we are 
not aware of many situations in which procrastination and/or self-control problems play a 
major role in firm behavior, although these behaviors are prominent in discussions behavioral 
economics as applied to consumers.  
 
We  have  seen  a  number  of  reasons  why  firms  may  not  maximize  their  profits,  and  his 
potentially has implications for empirical studies of markets. Empirical market studies often 
assume profit-maximizing behaviour on the part of firms to produce their estimates of, say, 
marginal costs. In such cases, the analysis may lead to biased estimates of the welfare impact 
of a merger if in fact firms were not profit-maximizers. To illustrate, consider the merger 
situation in Huck et al. (2007) which we discussed in section 5. If one took the data from this 
experiment pre- and post-merger and, in line with the structural approach, assumed these data 
were generated by profit-maximizing firms, one would conclude that the merger must have 
induced substantial synergies. Only with reduced costs would it be possible for the merged 
firm to have higher outputs than the outsiders. This would affect estimates of the merger’s 
welfare consequences. While the true consequences are unambiguously negative (after all, in 
the  experiment  the  merged  firm  still  does  operate  with  the  same  costs),  sufficiently  big 
synergies could offset the loss in consumer welfare. Hence, if there are systematic deviations 
from  orthodox  profit-maximizing  assumptions,  structural  approaches  that  assume  profit-
maximization might detect increases in welfare when, in fact, welfare was reduced. 
 
Finally, while this article has surveyed behavioral economics as it applies to firms, in future it 
would  be  interesting  to  investigate  how  it  applies  also  to  policy-makers.  Competition 
authorities, like firms, operate within a complex and strategic environment, and may need to 
resort to rules-of-thumb and satisficing behavior. For instance, their use of per se rules, or a 
reliance on relatively rigid market definition and market share thresholds could be instances 
of this. It may also be advantageous to induce competition authorities to have an objective or 
institutional focus which differs from social welfare, in order to alter the response from the 
firms subject to regulation.
67 Imitative strategies may sometimes be employed, and safety in 
numbers may be enjoyed, as policy-makers look around the world for current "best practice". 
(Indeed,  the  recent  emphasis  on  behavioural  economics  may  be  an  instance  of  this.) 
Friedman's point about competitive pressures may have less force in terms of constraining 
good decision making by public officials, and the result may be that behavioural biases are 
more prevalent among policy-makers than in the firms they oversee.     
                                                           
67 For instance, Armstrong and Vickers (2010) show how it can be optimal for a competition authority to permit 
only those mergers which do not harm consumers, even if society places equal weight on profit and consumer 
surplus. The reason is that a "consumer standard" affects the merger opportunities considered by firms, in a way 
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